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Serving the Same Interests: The Wood Green Ricin Plot, 
Media-State-7HUURU5HODWLRQVDQGWKH´7HUURULVPµ
Dispositif  
This article analyses the representations of terrorism that arise out of the BBC·VFRYHUDJHRIWKH
Wood Green ricin plot (2003), the first instance of al-Qaeda-related activity in the United Kingdom 
GXULQJWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµ,QVSLUHGE\WKHZRUN0LFKHO)RXFDXOW the article suggests that the 
%%&·VUHSresentations form part of an emeUJHQW´WHUURULVPµdispositif, or apparatus, which draws 
together seemingly disparate and antagonistic groups into a strategic, mutually-sustaining alliance. 
The DQDO\VLVIRFXVHVRQWZRZHHNV·ZRUWKRI%%&´1HZVDW7HQµEXOOHWLQVDORQJVLGHVSHHFKHV
and press releases issued by the Prime Minister and statements released by al-4DHGD·VOHDGHUVKLS
,Q SDUWLFXODU WKH DUWLFOH VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH %%&·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQDGYHUWHQWO\ ZRUN WR WKH
advantage of elements within al-Qaeda and the British executive due to the fact that they portray 
the Wood Green events in ways that are tactically useful to both groups. As such, the article not 
only provides substantive new empirical insights into the way representations of terrorism were 
mobilised in the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but also shows how Foucauldian concepts 
can provide creative and innovative analytical tools for understanding the dynamics of the 
contemporary media-state-terrorism relationship. 
Key words: Al-4DHGD%%&¶1HZVDW7HQ·, Chilcot Report, dispositif, media-state-terror relationship, Wood 
Green ricin plot 
There is a long history of politicians turning terrorism to their advantage. Such rhetorical 
GLPHQVLRQZKHUHE\ WKHSXEOLF·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRISRWHQWLDO WKUHDWVFDQEHPDQLSXODWHG
becomes even more critical in a situation in which the activities of the terrorists, as well as 
those of the counter-terrorists, are shrouded in classified secrecy. This can lead to the not 
uncommon situation in which the alleged enemies feed rhetorically into one DQRWKHU·V
interests, as each side perceives political advantage in the very existence of the other 
(Zulaika & Douglass 2008: 29). 
 
the point is, rather, that the two sides are not really opposed... they belong to the same 
ILHOGåLæHN-51).  
 
At around 6am on the morning of January 5th 2003, British police and anti-terror officials raided a 
suspected makeshift chemicals weapons factory in Wood Green, North London. They found, what 
was initially thought to be, small traces of the biological agent ricin, alongside over £4000 in cash 
and a series of recipes for the production of several other deadly toxins, such as solanine, cyanide, 
nicotine poison and botulinum (See Lawrence & Archer 2010). Within days the authorities quickly 
declared the find to EHHYLGHQFHRIDQH[WHQVLYH´DO-4DHGDµ plot that had direct links to its core 
leadership in Afghanistan, with the Prime Minister, in particular, drawing further links between 
raids and the broader threat posed by rogue states and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
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,QGHHGWKHVHFRQQHFWLRQVZHUHH[SOLFLWO\KLJKOLJKWHGZLWKLQWKH%%&·VFRYHUDJHRIWKHVHLQFLGHQWV
D FODLPHFKRHG WKURXJKRXW%ULWDLQ·V OHDGLQJ WDEORLG DQGEURDGVKHHWQHZVSDSHUV WKH IROORZLQJ
day),1 and were also later cited by U.S. Secretary of 6WDWHDVHYLGHQFHRID´VLQLVWHUQH[XVµEHWZHHQ
6DGGDP+XVVDLQ·V%DDWK3DUW\DQGDO-Qaeda in his February 5th 2003 speech to the United Nations 
Security Council (Powell 2003).  
Despite the significance of the Wood Green plot to development and expansion of Britain 
DQG$PHULFD·V´ZDURQWHUURUµKRZHYHUWKHVHHYHQWVKDYHUHFHLYHGOLWWOHLQWKHZD\RIGHWDLOHG
academic scrutiny (See Miller 2006; Matthews 2015, for cursory analysis). The scholarly and 
historical silences towards these incidents are even more remarkable given the conclusions of the 
UHFHQW ,UDT ,QTXLU\ DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU /RUG &KLOFRW·V FULWLFLVP  RI WKH FRQQHFWLRQV PDGH
between Iraq, WMD, and al-Qaeda by the Blair government during the same time period. The 
report explicitly highlights the VKDUHGDVVHVVPHQWRI%ULWDLQ·VLQWHOOLJHQFHFRPPXQLW\WKDW´WKHUH
was no credible evidence of covert WMD-related technology and expertise to [international] 
WHUURULVWJURXSVµSULRUWRWKHLQYDVLRQDQGPRUHWRWKHSRLQWWKDWWKHUHZDV´QRHYLGHQFH
RIFXUUHQWFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQ,UDTDQG$O4DLGDµ,ELG,QIDFW&KLOFRWJRHVRQWRHPSKDVLVH
WKDW´%ODLUKDGEHHQDGYLVHGWKDWDQLQYDVLRQRI,UDTZDVH[SHFWHGWRincrease the threat to the UK 
DQG8.LQWHUHVWVIURP$O4DLGDDQGLWVDIILOLDWHVµ,ELGHPSKDVLVDGGHGZLWK%ULWDLQ·VDFWLRQV
LQVWHDGSURYLGLQJWKHJURXSZLWKWKH´VSDFHLQZKLFKWRRSHUDWHµDQGWKH´XQVHFXUHGERUGHUV
DFURVVZKLFKLWVPHPEHUVPLJKWPRYHµIbid: 110).  
With this in mind, the following analysis provides vital, and much-needed, empirical insight 
into the way these events were presented to British citizens, and, more specifically, the way 
representations of terrorism were mobilised for political purposes in the build up to the invasion 
RI,UDT'XHWRWKH%%&·VKLJKO\LQIOXHQWLDOVWDWXVZLWKLQ%ULWDLQ·VPHGLDODQGVFDSH6HH%RUQ
Flood et al 2012; Mills 2016), not to mention the fact that it was the first news institution to 
explicitly highlight the connection between the Wood Green arrests, al-Qaeda, WMD and Iraq, 
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the article focuses on this institution and seeks to analyse the way it sought to represent the terror 
threat LWV´1HZVDW7HQµSURJUDPPHWKH8.·VPRVWSRSXODUDQGWUXVWHGEXOletin during the 
period analysed (Hargreaves & Thomas 2002: 5).  
,QVSLUHGE\WKHZRUNRI0LFKHO)RXFDXOW6HHWKHDUWLFOHYLHZVWKH%%&·V
representations as a series of cultural performances that help to support and sustain a wider dispositif 
² a strategically orientated social ensemble that encompasses a broad range of discursive and non-
discursive elements ² that emerges in response to an urgent need. Though Foucault was careful to 
point out that such an ensemble is beyond the control of any one group or set of institutions, the 
analysis shows how the strategic orientation of the dispositif during this event helps to produce 
representations that work, albeit inadvertently, to the advantage of elements within the British 
executive and the broader al-Qaeda movement, portraying the terror threat in ways are tactically 
XVHIXOWRERWKJURXSV7KXVIRUWKHYDULRXVLQGLYLGXDOVJURXSVDQGPRYHPHQWVWKDWFRPSULVH´DO-
4DHGDµWKHVHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVSURYLGHWKLVIUDJPHQWHGHQWLW\QRWRQO\ZLWKDFRhesive form and 
structure, but also with a powerful propaganda image that is disproportionate to its true size and 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVDIWHU+HOOPLFK6LPLODUO\IRUWKH´VPDOOFRWHULHµRISROLWLFLDQVDQGVSHFLDO
advisors that were close to the Prime 0LQLVWHU GXULQJ WKLV SHULRG WKH %%&·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
engender a vision of the enemy that serves to legitimise the far-reaching foreign policy aims that 
HPHUJHGGXULQJWKHHDUO\\HDUVRIWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµDIWHU.HWWHOO7KLVLVLQQRZD\
to suggest that the BBC was complicit with policymakers within the Blair cabinet or figures within 
the al-Qaeda movement, but rather that the focus on this institution helps to shed light on the way 
the news media, of which the Corporation is primus inter pares in the U.K., form part of a complex 
nexus of strategic power-knowledge relations that, at times, works to the advantage of such groups.  
Given the fact that these events took place nearly 15 years ago, the article begins with a 
brief historical overview to the Wood Green events and the broader context of the coming 
invasion of Iraq. Following this, the discussion moves on to introduce the concept of the dispositif 
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(explaining what it is, what it consists of, and how it helps us to understand the way mediated 
representations form a crucial point of convergence between a heterogeneous assemblage of 
discursive and non-discursive elements), before outlining the methodological framework used in 
the analysis; namely Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1995). The article then analyses two 
ZHHNV·ZRUWKRI%%&´1HZVDW7HQµEXOOHWLQVDLUHGLQWKHLPPHGLDWHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHVHLQFLGHQWV
up until reporting restrictions were imposed by the Blair government (January 7th ² 20th 2003). The 
analysis begins with a description of how the terror threat was ILUVWFRQVWUXFWHGZLWKLQWKH%%&·V
reporting, and then goes on to show how such portrayals fed into the strategic interests of the two 
groups identified above. The article ends with a consideration of the way the concept of the dispositif 
can help us better understand recent coverage of the Syria conflict and its representations of the 
Islamic State phenomenon. 
7KH:RRG*UHHQULFLQ´SORWµ:0'DQGWKHFRPLQJLQYDVLRQRI,UDT 
The events in Wood Green, London had complex origins that transcended the narrow historical 
WLPHIUDPHRIWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµ7KHEUXWDOWHQ-\HDUORQJFLYLOZDULQ$OJHULDDQGWKH´VWDWHRI
HPHUJHQF\µ LPSRVHG E\ the Bouteflika regime, created the conditions in which hundreds of 
Algerian dissidents sought asylum in the United Kingdom. Many new arrivals settled in the area 
around BlDFNVWRFN5RDGDQG)LQVEXU\3DUNZKLFKTXLFNO\EHFDPHNQRZQDV´OLWWOH$OJLHUVµE\
Londoners (Collyer 2003). During this period, relations between the British security services and 
exiled members of various Algerian dissident groups were close, leading to the establishment of 
DQXQRIILFLDO´FRYHQDQWRIVHFXULW\µ6HH&XUWLV-267; Pantucci 2015: 148-151), which 
created the LQLWLDOFRQGLWLRQVRISRVVLELOLW\IRUWKH´WHUURULVPµdispositif that forms the theoretical 
basis of this article. From this secure UK base, groups such as the Islamic Salvation Front and the 
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria would recruit, organise, and finance operations in Algeria, 
something that eaUQHGWKHFDSLWDOWKHVREULTXHW´LondonistanµZLWKLQVHFXULW\FLUFOHV during the 
late 1990s. While the primary focus of these groups was on unseating the Bouteflika regime in 
Algiers, some of those involved had trained in al-Qaeda-linked camps in Afghanistan during the 
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early 1990sDQGKDGWKXVEHJDQWRH[SORUHZD\VRIWDUJHWLQJ´IDUHQHP\µUHJLPHVLQ)UDQFHDQG
beyond (Gerges 2005).  
Much of this changed, however, in the post-September 11th 2001 security environment, 
where an increased sense of urgency brought about greater levels of cooperation between the 
British security services and overseas intelligence agencies. In particular, the Algerian government 
received massive levels of military and financial support and intelligence from the United Kingdom 
and other western states (Keenan 2006). One of the more significant outcomes of this new spirit 
of cooperation was the arrest of a 35 year-old Algerian named Mohammed Meguerba on 
December 16th 2002. Under harsh interrogation methods, Meguerba revealed how he had received 
extensive chemicals and explosives training at a training camp in Afghanistan and how he had 
passed on these skills to an al-Qaeda cell based in London (Archer & Bawdon 2010: 94). This 
information led to the arrests of a number of Algerian asylum seekers in the Wood Green area of 
North London on January 5th 2003. As noted, the raids revealed significant amounts of cash and 
recipes for the production of several crude, but deadly, poisons. Further examination of the flat 
revealed natural ingredients which could be used to produce some of the poisons detailed in the 
recipes; these included small piles of cherry stones, apple pips, and castor beans (Ibid: 118-119). 
Although toxicologists carrying out tests initially urged caution, the story was leaked by an 
anonymous source on January 7th 2003, where it was covered extensively by the BBC and ITN, 
and then by the print media the following day. Due to the level of media interest generated by the 
find, the Cabinet Office sought to issue precautionary information about the dangers posed by 
ricin through the newly established Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), via its News 
Coordination Centre (NCC) (See Miller 2004: 85-88). Ironically, the news coverage devoted to the 
raids alerted the alleged mastermind behind the plot, a 28 year-old Algerian asylum seeker called 
Kamel Bourgass, to the fact that the security services were apprehending him. By chance the police 
later stumbled upon Bourgass during an unrelated immigration arrest in Crumpsall, Greater 
Manchester. When he realised that he had been identified he lashed out at those guarding him, 
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stabbing three police officers and killing Stephen Oake, a Manchester-based Detective-Constable. 
As a result of this event, reporting restrictions were imposed from January 16th 2003 until the end 
of the trial in 2005, something that shrouded the poisons plot in an additional layer of secrecy.  
 As these events were taking place, however, senior figures within the Bush and Blair 
regimes were finalising their case for the invasion of Iraq. While very much a U.S.-led intervention, 
the preparation for war was dependent upon the support offered by Britain and its allies (Doig et 
DO   7KH UHOHDVH RI GRVVLHUV RQ ,UDT·V :MD capability by the Blair government, on 
September 24th 2002 and February 3rd 2003, further sought to highlight the connections between 
Saddam Hussain, international terrorism and WMD (See Herring & Robinson 2014a and 2014b; 
Robinson 2017). These documents were accompanied by a government-sanctioned propaganda 
FDPSDLJQ WRSUHSDUHPHGLD DQGSXEOLFRSLQLRQ IRUZDUDQGSURPRWH LQIRUPDWLRQDERXW ,UDT·V
´:0' UHFRQVWLWXWLRQ DQG RWKHU FULPHVµ PRVW VLJQLILFDQW RI ZKLFK ZHUH LWV FRQQHFWLRQV WR
international terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, to British newspapers and broadcasters 
(Robinson 2017: 52). Capitalising on these reports, on February 5th 2003, Colin Powell explicitly 
cited the supposed discovery of ricin in Wood Green as further evidence of a connection between 
al-4DHGDDQG6DGGDP+XVVDLQ·V%DDWKSDUW\DFODLPVXSSRUWHGDQGHQGRUVHGE\)RUHLJQ6HFUHWDU\
Jack Straw hours after. Incidentally, as the first bombs fell on Baghdad on March 20th 2003, British 
politicians were formally informed that no actual ricin had been discovered at the Wood Green 
flat; a fact that would not be made public until the April 2005 trial (Archer & Bawdon 2010: 79).    
The media-state-terror relationship and emergence of the contemporary 
¶terrorism·dispositif   
Despite the scholarly and historical silence surrounding these events, the Wood Green plot 
provides a fitting case through which to reconsider the broader power relations that underpin the 
bond between the media, state actors and terrorist groups, and, in particular, the way 
representations of terrorism are mobilised for political purposes during moments of crisis and 
uncertainty. While this relationship has been the subject of an extensive level of academic scrutiny 
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6HH6FKOHVLQJHUHWDO+HUPDQ	2·6XOOLYDQ$ODL	(NH3DOHW]	6FKPLG
1RUULVHWDO-DFNVRQ1DFRV+RVNLQV	2·/RXJKOLQ3DSDFKDULVVL	2OLYHLUD
2008; Reece & Lewis 2009; Freedman & Thussu 2012), much of debate has tended to centre upon 
the extent to which news media coverage of terrorist events either works in favour of governments 
or terrorists (See Norris et al 2003: 3).  
Drawing on the theoretical insight of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, 
and in particular his conceptualisation of the dispositif (1980), this article would like to pursue a 
different approach to the analysis of the media-state-terror relationship; one that, importantly, 
avoids the inherent dualism of much of the existing literature and provides greater theoretical 
insight into the symbiotic, transactional affiliation noted in previous studies (See Wilkinson 1997; 
Leibes & Kampf 2004; Hoffman 2006), and, instead, lays bare the complex interactions and 
mutually-sustaining power relations that support such coverage. This is not meant to substitute 
existing conceptual models, but rather to provide an alternative, and in some way complimentary, 
approach that takes into consideration the complexities of news media representations of 
terrorism, and the effects or unintended consequences of such portrayals.   
Though he never advanced a complete definition of the term, Foucault viewed the dispositif 
as a method for analysing relations of power that explicitly avoided simplistic, hierarchies of 
control and dominance; viewing them instead as a series of interactions between a complex range 
of individuals, ideologies and institutions. Distancing it from his earlier analyses and archaeologies 
RI´GLVFRXUVHµ , Foucault characterised the dispositif as a large-scale, social ensemble that 
encompasses an extraordinarily diverse range of phenomena (1980). His careful separation of 
dispositif IURP WKDW RI DQ ´apparaWXVµ, in which the latter is used to describe state-specific 
mechanisms of power, enables us to recognise the complex ways in which power functions to 
shape knowledge in society (Bussolini 2010: 94). In his most comprehensive conceptualisation of 
the term, he describes the dispositif as 
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a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral, and philanthropic propositions ² in short the said as much as the unsaid (Foucault 
1980: 194).  
 
More specifically, for Foucault the dispositif is not so much the individual elements listed above, 
EXWFDQEHYLHZHGDVWKH´system of relationsµ that is established between such elements; linking 
together a broad range of discursive and non-discursive phenomena into a seemingly singular, 
totalising configuration. :KLOH WKLV ´V\VWHPµ is beyond the control of any single group or 
individual, due to the fact that their very identities and modes of subjectivity are engendered within 
the discursive structures of such a dispositif, they, nevertheless, emerge at a specific historical 
moments in order to fulfil an important political or social purpose. As Foucault points out, the 
dispositif KDVD´GRPLQDQWVWUDWHJLFIXQFWLRQµ in that it UHVSRQGVWRDQ´urgent needµ at a given time 
(Ibid: 195). This sense of immediacy brings together a variety of, often fragile and conflicting, 
elements which work together in order to address the problem at hand.  
By way of an example, in the past 15 years we have witnessed the emergence of what can 
EHGHVFULEHG DV D JOREDO ´WHUURULVPµ dispositif; a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of agents, 
conflicts, politico-ideological encounters and semiotic resources. While some have identified 
elements RIWKLV´WHUURULVP·µ dispositif in the social and political turmoil of 1930s Europe (Ditrych 
2013), its most recent manifestation can be understood as responding to the urgent need of the 
September 11th 2001 attacks and the subsequent wars, interventions, and counterterrorism 
practices that have arisen in response to that event (See Jackson 2005; Jarvis 2009; Hodges 2011). 
$V&ODXGLD$UDGDXDQG5HQV9DQ0XQVWHUKDYHVKRZQWKLV´ZDUµKDVHQJHQGHUHGQHZZD\VRI
seeing, speaking and thinking about the phenomeQRQRIWHUURULVPZKHUHE\´WHUURULVPµWDNHVRQ
a simultaneously catastrophic and uncertain dimension (2007). This representation of terror is 
characterised by an ontological and epistemological uncertainty in regard to who, what, and where 
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´WHUURULVPµ FDQ be located, thus, giving rise to new modes of governance and techniques for 
managing populations, and renewed rationalities and technologies for countering such threats.  
As such, the dispositif draws together a whole series of discourses and discursive formations 
(such as the FRQFHSW RI ´2ULHQWDOLVPµ ´,VODPRSKRELDµ or thH QRWLRQ RI ´,VODPLF WHUURULVPµ
GLVFXUVLYHSUDFWLFHV OLNH´SUH-HPSWLYHDVVDVVLQDWLRQµ´H[WUDRUGLQDU\ UHQGLWLRQµDQG´ELRPHWULF
VXUYHLOODQFHµ alongside social and cultural institutions (including elements within the media, the 
government and the security and intelligence services), architectural forms and structures (such as 
the airport, the terrorist training camp, or the detention centre), as well as a number of 
philosophical propositions and forms of knowledge and power (sustained by academic disciplines 
such as Area Studies, Terrorism and Security Studies, Politics, International Relations and 
Contemporary History). These heterogeneous elements are brought together and aligned in 
formation with the principle purpose of JRYHUQLQJWKHWKUHDWSRVHGE\´WHUURULVPµ, and, in doing 
so, engender new forms of knowledge, power, identity and subjectivity.  
Crucially, however, while Foucault sought to emphasise that the dispositif is beyond the 
control of any single group or individual (1980: 195), this is not to say its strategic orientation does 
QRW EHQHILW FHUWDLQ JURXSV HQJDJHG LQ WKH ´ZDU RQ WHUURUµ ,QGHHG DOWKRXJK dispositifs are 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\´DQLQKHUHQWPRELOLW\DQGLQVWDELOLW\µ$UDGDXHWDODV-HIIUH\%XVVROLQL
observes, the IDFW WKDW )RXFDXOW UHIHUV WR VXFK IRUPDWLRQV DV EHLQJ ´D UDWLRQDO DQG FRQFHUWHG
LQWHUYHQWLRQLQGLFDWHVWKDWLWLVVRPHWKLQJPRUHWKDQMXVWDFKDRWLFWXUEXOHQFHRIIRUFHVµ
92). Thus, contrary to much of the overtly poststructuralist scholarship drawing upon his work 
(See Hülsse & Spencer 2008, for example), it is important to remember that Foucault always sought 
to maintain the underlying assumption that social subjects possess a minimal level of agency and 
intentionality, and that they can appropriate a limited range of ways of seeing and speaking about 
the world in order to further their own apparent self-interest (See Bevir 1999; Caldwell 2007; Bakir 
+LVGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH´IRUPDWLRQRIVWUDWHJLHVµLQThe Archaeology of Knowledge (1974) further 
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enabled him to show how certain individuals and groups are able to invest discourse with meaning 
and appropriate them for their own ends. As he explains,  
in our societies (and no doubt in many others) the property of discourse ² in the sense of 
the right to speak, ability to understand, licit and immediate access to the corpus of already 
formulated statements, and the capacity to invest this discourse in decisions, institutions 
or practices ² is in fact confined (sometimes with the addition of legal sanctions) to a 
particular group of individuals (Ibid: 75).    
  In this regard, the dispositif can be viewed, to borrow the terminology employed by 
:LOOLDP(&RQQROO\DVDNLQGRI´UHVRQDQFHPDFKLQHµLQZKLFKGLIIHUHQWSKHQRPHQD
FRPHWRJHWKHULQ´HPHUJHQWDQGUHVRQDQWUDWKHUWKDQHIILFLHQWUHODWLRQVKLSVµ%LDODVLHZLF]HWDO
2006: 408). Such a relationship can be seen to produce common goals and interests that, while 
sometimes divergent, often orientate themselves towards a common purpose as a result of 
VKDUHG´affinitiesµRU´sensibilitiesµ&RQQROO\$V&RQQROO\H[SODLQVZLWhin this machine 
diverse elements infiltrate into others, metabolizing into a moving complex ² causation as 
a resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. Here 
causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized 
complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore 
unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, 
forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation (Ibid: 870).  
 
Here, the individual ideological, doctrinal, economic, political or religious differences of each 
group or element are supressed, as the machine, or in our case the dispositif, gives rise to new 
configurations of power relations that have uncertain consequences for those involved.         
As the analysis outlined below seeks to demonstrate, of all those involved in the Wood 
Green incidents, two groups in particular stand to gain from the emergence of such a dispositif; 
these are the various individuals, groups and organisations that comprise the al-Qaeda movement, 
and the small number of influential politicians that formed the head of the Blair government. In 
identifying these two groups, the point here is not to suggest that the BBC is in some way 
deferential or subservient to their interests, thus imposing a second-order judgement on its 
coverage, but rather to show how the dispositif produces representations that have, in the words of 
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1LNRODV5RVH´XQSDODWDEOHIXQFWLRQVµ and unintended consequences (1984: 116). Indeed, though 
it certainly problematic to regard these two disparate groupings as being fixed in form, identity and 
strategic outlook, there is sufficient reason to view them as having a shared set of objectives during 
the period analysed.  
For example, despite its fragmented structure IRU ´DO-4DHGDµ VWDWHPHQWV UHOHDVHG E\
prominent figures within the broader jihadi movement during this event reveal a common set of 
aims and objectives that were to be implemented at both a global and local level (See Kepel & 
Milleli 2008; Lia 2009; Schmid 2014). One of the most salient of these was the desire to overwhelm 
adversaries by drawing them into a series of wars of attrition (Byman 2015: 51). Such a strategy 
was explicitly outlined around the time of the Wood Green event by the influential Jihadist thinker 
Abu Musab al-Suri, who suggested that the best way to defeat the enemy was to use multiple, 
loosely-connected cells and operatives to launch attacks on Western targets so as to encourage an 
overreaction (See Sageman 2008; Lia 2009; Byman 2015). As bin Laden himself made clear,  
all we have to do is send two mujahedin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth 
on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America to 
suffer human, economic, and political losses (2004).  
Central to this strategy, moreover, was the news media as a key site through which this 
DV\PPHWULFDOVWUXJJOHZDVWRWDNHSODFH+HUHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIDQ\´DO-4DHGDµ-related activity 
would provide a potent weapon for promoting political grievances and relaying the threat to a 
wider audience. In adopting this multifaceted approach, therefore, the various individuals and 
groups who self-LGHQWLILHGDV´DO-4DHGDµDQGWKRVH who aligned with its worldview, were able to 
maintain a level of influence over the security agenda of Western states, and, perhaps more 
crucially, capitalise on the levels of fear and uncertainty that surrounded various plots and acts of 
terror carried out in its name.  
On a similar level, though we should express equal caution in regard to the notion of a 
VLQJXODU´%ULWLVKexecutiveµVHYHUDOVWXGLHVKDYHKLJKOLJKWHGWKHIDFWWKDW WKURXJKRXWWKH´ZDURQ
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WHUURUµ 8. FRXQWHUWHUURULVP SROLF\ KDV FRUUHVSRQGHG WR WKH LQWHUHVWV RI D VPDOO number of 
influential politicians surrounding the Prime Minister (See Curtis 2010; Kettell 2010 & 2013; 
Edmunds et al 2014; Robinson & Herring 2014a). As Steven Kettell points out, following 
successive electoral losses during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the underlying structure 
of the Labour party became increasingly centralised, elitist and hierarchical in nature, something 
that, moreover, enDEOHGIRUHLJQDQGGRPHVWLFFRXQWHUWHUURULVPSROLF\GXULQJWKH´ ZDURQWHUURU·Vµ
early years to be shaped by a small number of influential figures (2010: 50-51). One of the key 
interests motivating this group was to highlight the links between a range of disparate and distant 
threats, and then draw these together into a singular and unifying narrative so as to justify a narrow 
set of policy objectives. As Tony Blair himself acknowledged in the aftermath of the Wood Green 
arrests,  
I think it is important that we do everything we can to try and show people the link between 
the issue of weapons of mass destruction and these international terrorist groups, mainly 
linked to al-Qaeda, who will do literally anything they possibly can in order to destroy and 
disrupt the lives of ordinary people.2 
 
Most significant of these objectives at the time was the legitimisation of the coming Iraq invasion. 
In the face of massive legal and public opposition to this war, key figures within the Blair 
government sought to develop a sophisticated media and public relations campaign through which 
to warn of the dangers posed by a convergence between Saddam Hussain, international terrorism 
DQG:0'DQGWKXV´SUHSDUHSXEOLFRSLQLRQµIRUZDU.HWWHOO-59). As Alastair Campbell, 
Director of Communications for number 10, advised in the weeks leading up to the invasion, the 
8.QHHGHG´WRPDNHPRUHRI WKH LVVXHRI:0'PRUHJHQHUDOO\ DQGPDNH WKH OLQN ODUJHO\
XQEHOLHYHGKHUHRULQWKH86ZLWKWHUURULVPµ&KLOFRW5HSRUW² Section 3.6, 2016: 67).  
To say that these two groups share the same set of political interests, despite being engaged 
LQRSHQ´ ZDUµZLWKRQH another, is, however, a particularly contentious claim, and is one that would 
be immediately rejected by both parties. And yet, LQUHVSRQGLQJWRWKH´urgent needµRIWKH:RRG
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Green plot, the very nature of the dispositif engenders such a tangled and internally contradictory 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHFDXVH HDFK HOHPHQW HQWHUV LQWR ´UHVRQDQFH RU FRQWUDGLFWLRQµ ZLWK RQH DQRWKHU
producing effects an outcomes that are beyond the control of any single actor (1980: 195). Thus, 
despite being in a state of prolonged conflict, the emergence of a post-September 11th 2001 
´WHUURULVPµGLVSRVLWLIKDVEURXJKWDO-Qaeda and elements within the British government into a 
strange, mutually-sustaining relationship that has advantages and unintended outcomes for both 
parties. In fact, what the analysis outlined below seeks to demonstrate is that politicians, political 
parties, terrorist groups, journalists, and news editors all take part in a variety of relationships, 
´VRPHWLPHVFRQFLOLDWRU\RIWHQKRVWLOHEXWXOWLPDWHO\DUHDOOSDUWRIRQHDSSDUDWXVµ%DVX
93).  
Research design  
Importantly, while much of the existing literature on the concept of the dispositif tends to focus 
analysis on macro-level social ensembles, such as the use of biometric technologies to manage and 
protect populations from crime, terrorism and illegal immigration (See Amoore 2006; Aradau and 
van Munster 2007; Bigo & Tsoukala 2008), this article provides a contribution to this body of 
scholarship by suggesting that it is within the news media that dispositifs are at their most visible. 
The reason for this is because mediated representations form a crucial point of convergence 
between a broad range of discourses, discursive formations, social and cultural institutions, and 
IRUPVRINQRZOHGJHDQGSRZHU+HUH WKH´V\VWHPRIUHODWLRQVµWKDWVXVWDLQVDdispositif can be 
witnessed directly, as each of its heterogeneous elements are brought together into an often volatile 
working relation. These elements come together as a shifting configuration of words, images and 
sounds, title-screens, headlines, straplines, studio settings, interview segments and live feeds, which 
communicate information to a seemingly singular, yet socially and politically fragmented, audience. 
 In order to interrogate these aspects of the dispositif, and, more importantly, the 
representations that emerge within it, the analysis outlined below draws upon the methodological 
approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (See Fairclough 1995; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; 
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Wodak & Mayer 2009). CDA is principally concerned with the way media representations function 
as a sources and sites for the production and reproduction of knowledge and power. More 
specifically, CDA seeks to focus analytical attention on the textual, intertexual and contextual 
dimensions of media coverage (Fairclough 1995). As Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips 
DVVHUWWKLVDSSURDFK´LVEDVHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWWH[WVFDQQHYHUEHXQGHUVWRRGRUDQDO\VHGLQ
isolation ² they can only be understood in relation to webs of other texts/discourses and in relation 
WRWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[WµLQZKLFKWKH\DUHFUHDWHG 70).  
Though in some ways ill-VXLWHG WR )RXFDXOW·V VFHSWLFDO YLHZ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI
´PHWKRGRORJ\µWHFKQLTXHVZKLFKKHFRQVLGHUHGWREHWKHPVHOYHVdiscourses that predetermined 
arguments in the name of power and knowledge, CDA can help us shed light on the historical 
FRQGLWLRQV RI SRVVLELOLW\ WKURXJK ZKLFK WHUURULVW SKHQRPHQD VXFK DV ´DO-4DHGDµ DUH PDGH
meaningful. Perhaps more than this, however, in focusing the analysis primarily upon the 
discursive aspects of the dispositif, such as news media representations, the material and non-
discursive features of such an ensemble are given less attention in a CDA. This is not to say they 
are completely overlooked, but given the sheer size and scale of any one dispositif no analysis can 
ever be considered comprehensive or complete. And, of course, we should also be clear that news 
media institutions such as the BBC, themselves, form only one part of such a complex and 
multifaceted social ensemble, thus the analysis outlined below cannot be verified or falsified in any 
rationalist or positivist sense. That said, in focusing on the representations and cultural 
performances that emerge within a particular institutional setting, CDA allows us to directly 
REVHUYHWKHYDULRXVVKLIWVDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVZKDW'HOHX]HGHVFULEHVDVWKH´FXUYHVRIYLVLELOLW\
DQG RI HQXQFLDWLRQµ   WKDW KHOS WR VXSSRUW DQG VXVWDLQ ZLGHU VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO
structures.    
For the analysLV WZRZHHNVRI´1HZVDW7HQµEXOOHWLQVZHUHVRXUFHGWKURXJKDUFKLYHV
housed at universities in Cardiff and Glasgow (January 7th ² 20th 2003). These broadcasts totalled 
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just over 7 hours of news coverage; of which 1 hour and 18 minutes of continual reporting were 
dedicated to events in Wood Green and Crumpsall. The central question driving the research was 
´+RZLVthe terror threat represented during the events in Wood Green, and in what way do these 
SRUWUD\DOV UHLQIRUFH WKH VWUDWHJLF REMHFWLYHV RI WKRVH ILJKWLQJ WKH ¶ZDU RQ WHUURU·"µ *LYHQ WKH
complex, multimodal nature of these television broadcasts, the case study approach can be 
understood to be the most appropriate method as it facilitates an intensive study of the various 
shifts and transformations that take place within a single unit (Gerring 2004). As Robert K. Yin 
points out, case studies are often the best method to adopt when the boundaries are blurred 
between the unit under analysis and the context in which such phenomena appear (2009: 18). Here, 
the representation of the terror threat is inseparable from, and often determined by, the nature of 
the event being reported on.  
The first stage of the analysis involved making detailed visual, verbal and aural transcripts 
RI HDFK ´1HZV DW 7HQµ EXOOHWLQ 7KHVH WUDQVFULSWV ZHUH WKHQ SODFHG DORQJVLGH RQH DQRWKHU LQ
chronological sequence, something that enabled close textual analysis of not only the main words, 
images and sounds used to portray the terror threat (after Howard & Davies 1983), but also the 
interactions that took place between these visual, verbal and sonic elements (Mitchell 1996). This 
strategy facilitated analysis of the kinds of deep, subtextual and symbolic meanings that inform 
and underpin news media representations and showed how certain modes of representation are 
often privileged at the expense of others (after Hutchings & Miazhevich 2009: 222).  
Nevertheless, while the main focus was on the close examination of BBC representations 
of the terror threat, in order to make sense of the findings and place them in context, a secondary 
research strategy was employed to examine speeches, statements, press conferences and broadcast 
material issued by the British Prime Minister and al-4DHGD·s leadership during the overall 
timeframe covered in the analysis. In the case of the Prime Minister, this involved looking at 
speeches, press statements and policy documents that were issued in the period around the Wood 
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Green events (January ² February 2003). These documents were readily available through 
government websites and online archives such as Hansard, Gov.uk and No10.gov.uk, where full 
transcripts of speeches by the Prime Minister are archived for the public record.  
In order to shed light on the strategic goals and objectives of al-Qaeda, moreover, 
propaganda statements and videos released by key figures within the movement were consulted. 
For obvious reasons, the frequency in which these documents were released by al-4DHGD·V
leadership meant that a much longer timeframe had to be considered; with statements and 
propaganda releases covering the October 2002 ² February 2003 period. Given the difficulties in 
establishing the source and authenticity of al-4DHGD·VRQOLQHRXWSXWPDWHULDOZDVWDNHQIUom a 
number of scholarly translations, edited collections and single-authored texts on al-4DHGD·V
ZRUOGYLHZ6HH/DZUHQFH·,EUDKLP.HSHO	0LOHOOL/LD$V*DGL:ROIVIHOG
SRLQWVRXWKRZHYHU´>D@WWHPSWLQJWR LQWHUSUHWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\RWKHUSHRSOH·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV LVD
ULVN\ZD\WRPDNHDOLYLQJµDQGLQPDNLQJWKHDUJXPHQWVRXWOLQHGEHORZWKHUHLVDOZD\V
the possibility that the modes of representation identified in the analysis are subject to interpretive 
bias of the researcher. Nevertheless, in drawing on multiple sites of representation, and indeed 
adhering to the sound methodological guidelines outlined in previous analyses of media texts, it is 
hoped that clarity and consistency of enquiry can be achieved across the data.  
January 7th ² 20th 2003: Constructing an Elusive Threat  
'HVFULEHGDWWKHWLPHDVWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHRI´DO-4DHGDµ-related activity in the United Kingdom 
(See Archer & Bawdon 2010: 78), the Wood Green events constitute, in Foucauldian terms, a 
´VWUDWHJLFPRPHQWµ)RXFDXOWRQHWKDWQRWRQO\HOHYDWHGWKHWHUURUWKUHDWWRH[LVWHQWLDO
levels, but also produced an alignment of relations between broad range of discursive and non-
discursive elements. The emergence of this dispositif is significant in that it serves to engender a 
SDUWLFXODUZD\RIVHHLQJDQGVSHDNLQJDERXW´WHUURULVPµ$V*LOOHV'HOHX]HDVVHUWVWKHdispositif 
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´KDVLWVZD\RIVWUXFWXULQJOLJKWWKHZD\LQZKLFKLWIDOOVEOXUVDQGGLVSHUVHVGLVWULEXWLQJWKHYLVLEOH
and invisible, gLYLQJELUWKWRREMHFWVZKLFKDUHGHSHQGHQWRQLWIRUWKHLUH[LVWHQFHµ 
In particular, this can be first seen in the levels of uncertainty surrounding the Wood Green 
events, and the way the plot is portrayed as the work of an elusive, almost shapeless threat spread 
out across the United Kingdom and beyond. For instanceLWLVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHUHPD\EH´RWKHU
SHRSOHRXWWKHUHWU\LQJWRGRWKHVDPHWKLQJµ3 WKDW´ELJJHUTXDQWLWLHVFRXOGEHLQWKHKDQGVRI
terrorists who are still at large in the FRXQWU\µ4 WKDW´SROLFH DUH VWLOO VHDUFKLQJ IRU DW OHDVW WZR
PHPEHUVRIWKHJURXSµ5  and WKDWWKHUHPD\EH´DPXFKZLGHUQHWZRUNµDWODUJHZLWKOLQNVWR
Europe, North Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan.6 7KHVOLSSDJHE\WKH%%&·VMRXUQDOLVWVEHWZHHQWKH
terms ´ DO-4DHGDµQ 11), at its peak during the first two days of reporting, and the broader, more 
GLIIXVH´QHWZRUNµ metaphor (n = 11) is further significant in this regard. While most likely the 
result of the uncertainty surrounding these events, the appearance of such labels enables the terror 
threat to become increasingly fluid in nature, thus facilitating connections to a broader range of 
phenomena. Here, the inherent dynamism and flexibility embedded within the ´QHWZRUNµ 
metaphor ensures that the boundaries surrounding the Wood Green incidents are dangerously 
extended (after Stohl & Stohl 2007: 95), thus further emphasising the levels of uncertainty and 
elusiveness underpinning the coverage; a notion powerfully underscored by Frank Gardner·VEOXQW
admonitioQ WKDW %ULWDLQ·V intelligence agencies WKHPVHOYHV ´VLPSO\ GRQ·W NQRZ KRZ ELJ WKH
QHWZRUNLVµ7   
$VLIWRIXUWKHUFRQILUPWKLVQRWLRQWKH%%&·VUHSRUWLQJalso features a series of references 
to the secretive, cell-like nature of the plot, with terms such DV ´FHOOVµ8 ´VOHHSHU FHOOVµ9 and 
´WHUURULVWFHOOVµ10 working to advance the belief that unknown number of terrorists hiding across 
the United Kingdom 7KH PHWDSKRU RI WKH ´VOHHSHU FHOOµ, a direct legacy of the U.S. anti-
&RPPXQLVW´ZLWFK-WULDOVµ of the 1950s and 1960s when it was believed that unknown numbers of 
highly-trained Communist spies were living in secret and masquerading as loyal American citizens, 
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here works to further the notion that terrorist operatives are at loose across the United Kingdom, 
waiting for orders from bin Laden and his lieutenants (Lustick 2006: 38). Indeed, the additional 
belief that the Wood Green eveQWV FRQVWLWXWH D VLQLVWHU DQG´VSUHDGLQJµ ´ZHEµ-like plot also 
draws upon the same discursive repository, with the boundaries surrounding the terror threat 
becoming increasingly vague and unclear as the coverage develops.11   
Interestingly, however, despite the presence of Cold War-era language and symbolism, it 
is clear that the portrayal of the terror threat is firmly embedded within the discursive structures 
RIWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµDQGWKHEURDGHUdispositif. This can be seen, for example, in the repeated 
references to the September 11th DWWDFNVDQGWKHQDUURZKLVWRULFDOWLPHOLQHRIWKH´ZDURQ
WHUURUµ$SSHDULQJDtotal of eight times across the period analysed, references to the September 
11th DWWDFNVVKLIWEHWZHHQWKHSRSXODULVHGDQGVKRUWHQHGYHUVLRQVRI´6HSWHPEHUthµ12 or 
´µ13 WRWKH´SRVW6HSWHPEHUILJKWDJDLQVWWHUURULVPµ14 ´WKHQHZSRVW-9/11 thrHDWµ15 or, 
RQDQXPEHURIRFFDVLRQVVLPSO\´SRVW-6HSWHPEHUµ16 +RPH$IIDLU·V&RUUHVSRQGHQW0DUJDUHW
Gilmore is the first to highlight this connection, describing how the ricin plot reflected the way 
´MXVWDIWHU6HSWHPEHUth in America someone was sending out letters with anthrax which created 
PDVVSDQLFDQGPDVVIHDUµ17 Occurring little more than fifteen months after the devastating attacks 
in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, it is, perhaps, to be expected that the events in Wood 
Green and ManchHVWHUZRXOGEHIRUWKHPRVWSDUWOLQNHGWRUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKH´ZDURQ
WHUURUµ$QG\HWDV5LFKDUG-DFNVRQSRLQWVRXWthe popular shortening of September 11th 2001 to 
´September 11µ or, more commonly, ´9/11µ is a powerful discursive practice which serves to 
´erase the history and context of the events and turn their representation into a cultural-political 
iconµ  . Within this narrative framework, the historical factors that led many young 
Algerians to settle in the Wood Green and High Road area of North London, such as the brutal, 
ten-year long civil war or the role of the Algerian security services in radicalising large swathes of 
the population, are powerfully silenced and obscured.  
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The elusive nature of the terror plot is perhaps more subtly communicated through the 
near-total lack of images and visual representations ZLWKLQWKH%%&·VFRYHUDJH. With the exception 
of a short, three-second sequence of footage taken from an Armed Islamic Group of Algeria 
propaganda video, in which an unknown number of militants are seen climbing out of a military 
vehicle,18 at no point during the coverage do any images of the alleged plotters appear in the %%&·V
reporting. Though this lack of images is most likely a result of there being no images available to 
broadcast, in the absence of a corresponding image, terms such as ´DO-4DHGDµ or the broader 
´QHWZRUNµ PHWDSKRU EHFRPH empty signifiers, and thus invite the BBC, and its audiences, to 
imagine what the terror threat is and what the plotters look like. Thus, rather than draw limitations 
around the power of the terror threat, its sheer invisibility becomes its most potent asset. As art 
historian W. J. T. Mitchell points out, when something is prevented from being shown or hidden 
DZD\IURPYLHZ´ LWVSRZHUDVDFRQFHDOHGLPDJHRXWVWULSVDQ\WKLQJLWFRXOGKDYHDFKLHYHGE\EHLQJ
VKRZQµ (2011: 63). This is not to say that the BBC deliberately prevents its audiences from having 
visual access to the terror threat, but more simply that the lack of visuals can be said to imbue its 
coverage with a considerable sense of uncertainty regarding who or what is behind the Wood 
Green events, thus encouraging further speculation about the scale and nature of the dangers 
posed to British citizens. Notably, this lack of images further contrasts with the immaterial, 
DVRPDWRXVQDWXUHRIULFLQDVDVXEVWDQFH6RIRUH[DPSOHWKH%%&·V1LDDO'LFNVRQVXJJHVWVWKDW
ULFLQ´FDQEHDGPLQLVWHUHG LQIRRGRUZDWHUVSUD\HGDVDQDHURVRORU LQMHFWHG directly into the 
YLFWLPµDQGFKHPLFDOSDWKRORJLVW$ODVWDLU+D\IXUWKHUVWKLVDVVHVVPHQWKLJKOLJKWLQJWKHIDFWWKDW
ULFLQFDQEH´EUHDWKHGLQµOHDGLQJWR´IDLOXUHRIWKHKHDUWµ19   
&XULRXVO\ KRZHYHU WKH %%&·V FRYHUDJH DOVR IHDWXUHV D VHULHV RI 2ULHQWDOLVWµ-inspired 
references to the religious and ethnic identity of the plotters, something that helps to stabilise the 
terror threat and arrest some of the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding their identity. Thus, we 
see references to the fact that the grRXSQRWRQO\FRQVLVWHGRI´,VODPLFH[WUHPLVWVµ20 who have 
´DGRSWHG DO-4DHGD·V anti-Western GRFWULQHVµ21 EXW DOVR WKDW WKRVH DUUHVWHG ZHUH ´$OJHULDQVµ, 
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´1RUWK $IULFDQVµ or, 22  PRUH VLPSO\ ´RXWVLGHUVµ23 DQG ´DV\OXP VHHNHUV housed by the local 
council at pubOLF H[SHQVHµ,24 and who ´HQWHUHG %ULWDLQ RQ IDOVH SDVVSRUWVµ25 and ´IDNH
GRFXPHQWVµ26 Notably, the connections between terrorism and %ULWDLQ·VLPPLJUDWLRQDQGDV\OXP
system are further intensified with the aUUHVWRI.DPHO%RXUJDVVWKHDOOHJHG´PDVWHUPLQGµEehind 
the plot. HereIRULQVWDQFH3HWHU6LVVRQVVXJJHVWVWKDW´TXHVWLRQVDUHQRZEHLQJDVNHGDERXWWKH
IDLOXUHRIWKHDV\OXPV\VWHPWRVWRSVXVSHFWHGWHUURULVWVµFRPLQJLQWRWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQG 
further VSHFXODWHVZKHWKHU´WHUURULVWVDUHVLPSO\XVLQJWKHDV\OXPV\VWHPWRJHWDIRRWKROGKHUHµ27 
6LPLODUO\0DUJDUHW*LOPRUHKLJKOLJKWVWKHIDFWWKDW´WKHUH·VOLNHO\WREHPXFKVRXOVHDUFKLQJDERXW
DV\OXPSROLFLHVDQGZKHWKHUWKHVHFRXOGEHDIIHFWLQJVRPHDVSHFWVRI8.VHFXULW\µ.28 In focusing 
on such statements the point here is not to deny the religious, ethnic or legal status of those 
arrested, or, moreover, to accuse the BBC of stoking populist fears and anxieties surrounding 
%ULWDLQ·VDV\OXPSROLF\5DWKHULWLVWRVKRZKRZWKH´WHUURULVPµdispositif draws together a variety 
of elements into its singular and totalising configuration, thus helping to secure a particular image 
of the terror threat.  
Discussion: Serving the Same Interests  
$VPHQWLRQHGDERYHWKHVWUDWHJLFORJLFDQGRULHQWDWLRQRIWKH´WHUURULVPµdispositif brings a range 
of previously unconnected phenomena into a resonant, yet internally contradictory, relationship; 
a process that produces unexpected and unintended political outcomes. In particular, tKH´V\VWHP
RI UHODWLRQVµ WKDW VXVWDLQV and underpins such an assemblage is particularly evident when we 
consider the range of social, cultural and political institutions from which the BBC constructs its 
narrative to events. Thus, appearing over the course of the two weeks of coverage we see 
statements and interviews with senior politicians and M.Ps (such as Tony Blair,29 Jack Straw,30 
David Blunkett,31 Oliver Letwin,32 and Simon Hughes),33 members of the police and security 
services (like Assistant Constable Alan Green34 and Roy Ramm),35 a host of terrorism and security 
´H[SHUWVµVXFKDV0DJQXV5DQVWRUS36 Reda Hessaine,37 Richard Cobbold,38, Nigel Churton39 and 
Jean-Francois Daguzan),40 chemical pathologists, toxicologists and health experts (like Alastair 
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Hay41 and Pat Troop),42 alongside several members of the public from the Wood Green and 
Crumpsall area.43 7KHVHVWDWHPHQWVDUHDOVRVXSSOHPHQWHGE\UHSHDWHGUHIHUHQFHVE\WKH%%&·V
MRXUQDOLVWVDQGFRUUHVSRQGHQWVWRYHLOHG´SROLFHµ´VHFXULW\µDQG´LQWHOOLJHQFHµVRXUFHV44 a trend 
highlighted in previous analyses of the role anonymous sources served in shaping news coverage 
of terrorism and anti-terror raids during this time (See Miller & Mills 2009; Matthews 2013). 
While Foucault always sought to make clear that dispositifs are beyond the control of any 
VLQJOHHQWLW\RIWKHYDULRXVSROLWLFDOJURXSVDQGPRYHPHQWVDSSHDULQJZLWKLQWKH%%&·VFRYHUDJH
two in particular stand to benefit from the representations described here; these are the various 
individuals, groups and organisations that comprise the al-Qaeda movement, and the small number 
of influential politicians that formed the head of the Blair government. This is not to say that the 
BBC directly colluded with such groups, but rather that the strategic orientation and focus of the 
dispositif helped to produce representations that functioned, albeit inadvertently, in their immediate 
interests. Here, to paraphrase Foucault, the various strategies deployed within the dispositif, that is, 
WKH´IRUPDWLRQRIVWUDWHJLHVµWKDWJRYHUQVXFh an assemblage, are defined by a certain constant 
way of relating possibilities, of associated discourses (and other discourses exterior to them), and 
a whole non-discursive field of practices, appropriations, interests and desires (1974: 69). 
At the most EDVLFDQGSROLWLFDOO\H[SHGLHQWOHYHOWKH%%&·VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH:RRG
Green plot as the work of an elusive, invisible network of terrorist cells would have been 
VWUDWHJLFDOO\ XVHIXO WR WKH YDULRXV LQGLYLGXDOV JURXSV DQG IUDQFKLVHV WKDW FRPSULVH ´DO-4DHGDµ 
GXULQJWKLVSHULRG,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWGXHWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·RYHUWO\PLOLWDU\UHVSRQVHWR
the attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, al-Qaeda had suffered massive military 
and economic losses, most specifically the loss of its base and training camps in Afghanistan. As 
Fawas Gerges has pointed out,  
[t]he period between September 11 until the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq was rich 
ZLWK SRVVLELOLWLHV DQG RSSRUWXQLWLHV UHJDUGLQJ WKH FDPSDLJQ DJDLQVW ELQ /DGHQ·V PHQ
Lacking any public Muslim support and with very few safe shelters, the noose was 
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tightening around their necks. On the run and defensive, al-Qaeda faced a decidedly bleak 
future (2011: 105). 
 
,QWKLVUHJDUGWKHPHUHIDFWWKDWWKHWHUP´DO-4DHGDµDQGWKHEURDGHUPRUHGLIIXVH´QHWZRUNµ
PHWDSKRULVXVHGZLWKLQWKH%%&·VUHSRUWLQJZRXOGKDYHEHHQLQFUHGLEO\XVHIXOWRQRWRQO\WKH
PRYHPHQW·V FRUH OHDGHUVKLS EXW DOVR WKRVH ZKR VRXJKW WR DOLJQ WKHPVHOYHV ZLWK ELQ /DGHQ·V
worldview, as it would have provided this disparate movement with a potent propaganda image 
that could be used to strike fear into the hearts and minds of its enemies. In particular, the levels 
RIXQFHUWDLQW\XQGHUSLQQLQJWKH%%&·VUHSRUWLQJRIZRXOGDOVRKDYHIXQFWLRQHGSRZHUIXOO\LQWKH
strategic interests of this group because it would have encouraged even more alarm over the scale 
of the poisons plot and anxiety over who was responsible.  
As noted above, a key strategy adopted by al-4DHGD·VFHQWUDOOHDGHUVKLSGXULQJWKLVSHULRG
was to exhaust its enemies through a strategy of attrition. This meant, encouraging its various 
franchises and sympathisers to carry out random, uncoordinated attacks in order to create 
FRQIXVLRQRYHUWKHDFWXDOVL]HDQGFDSDELOLW\RI´DO-4DHGDµDQGWKXVIXUWKHULWVSURSDJDQGDDLPV
While most statements released by al-4DHGD·VFRUHOHDGHUVKLSDURXQGWKH2FWREHU² January 
2003 period focus on the United States, several stress the importance of attacks against its allies. 
)RUH[DPSOHLQKLV´>W@RWKH$OOLHVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVµVSHHFKELQ/DGHQUHIHUUHGWR´VSRUDGLF
DFWLRQVµFDUULHGRXWDJDLQVW$XVWUDOLDQ)UHQFKDQG%ULWLVKWDUJHWVFLWHGLQ,EUDKLP-232). 
+LV2FWREHUVWDWHPHQW´,VUDHO2LODQG,UDTµIXUWKHUVRXJKWWRKLJKOLJKWWKHIDFWWKDW´>Z@H
have the right to retaliate at any time and place against all countries involved [in the up-coming 
Iraq invasion] ² particularly England, Spain, Australia, 3RODQG-DSDQDQG,WDO\µ,ELG7KH
aim of this strategy was to sow fear and confusion within the enemy populace in order to encourage 
an aggressive response. Indeed, in urging supporters to attack these nations, al-4DHGD·VOHDGHUVKLS
also emphasised the importance of adopting evasive, furtive and secretive methods. For example, 
LQ D VWDWHPHQW LVVXHG DURXQG 'HFHPEHU  ELQ /DGHQ XUJHG KLV IROORZHUV WR ´UHVRUW WR
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dissimulationµ HVSHFLDOO\ ZKHQ FDUU\LQJ RXW DFWV RI WHUURU FLWHG LQ .HSHO 	 0LOHOOL 008: 64, 
HPSKDVLVDGGHG+HDOVRXQGHUVFRUHGWKHQHHGIRUWKHPWRHPSOR\DUDQJHRIWHFKQLTXHVDQG´WR
use their intelligence in killing [the enemy] secretlyµFLWHGLQ,QWHOFHQWHUHPSKDVLVDGGHG
XVLQJ´camouflaged defensive positions in plainV IDUPVPRXQWDLQV DQGFLWLHVµ FLWHG LQ ,EUDKLP
2007: 246, emphasis added). These sentiments were further reinforced by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
XQGHUVFRUHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIOHDGHUOHVVUHVLVWDQFHVXJJHVWLQJWKDW´>y]oung Muslims need not wait 
for anyone·VSHUPLVVLRQ, because jihad against the Americans, the Jews, and their allies, hypocrites and 
DSRVWDWHVLVQRZDQLQGLYLGXDOGXW\µFLWHGLQ.HSHO	0LOHOOL$VVXFKLQUHSUHVHQWLQJ
the Wood Green incidents as the work of an elusive, hidden network of individuals and loosely-
FRQQHFWHGWHUURULVWFHOOVWKH%%&·VFRYHUDJHZRXOGKDYHVHUYHGWRUHLQIRUFHWKHOHYHOVRIIHDUDQG
uncertainty surrounding the al-4DHGDWKUHDWDQGWKXVKHOSWRIXUWKHUEROVWHUWKHJURXS·VRYHUDOO
propaganda image. 
At the same time, however, the dispositif produces an alignment in power-knowledge 
relations, bringing together previously unconnected and antagonistic groups and individuals into 
new, mutually-sustaining relations of resonance and symbiosis. In this regard, the portrayal of the 
Wood Green events as being the work of an elusive and secretive network of hidden cells and 
operatives would have been equally useful to the small number of influential politicians who 
formed the executive during this period, as it would have further legitimised claims made regarding 
the connections between the Wood Green events, al-Qaeda, Iraq and the issue of WMD. As noted 
above, while we should certainly express caution when viewing the British government in such 
narrow and monolithic terms, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the architecture of the 
parliamentary system enabled political decisions to be made by a small group of influential figures 
(Kettell 2010). Here, the vague, pliable boundaries surrounding the terror threat, and in particular 
WKHRVFLOODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWHUPV´DO-4DHGDµDQG´QHWZRUNµVHUYHDOEHLWXQZLWWLQJO\WRIDFLOLWDWH
connections between the Wood Green plotters and the broader threat posed by al-Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein.  
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Notably, this connection is emphasised within the first few minutes of the January 7th 2003 
EURDGFDVWE\/RQGRQFRUUHVSRQGHQW%HQ%URZQZKRSRLQWVRXWWKDW´>G@RFXPHQWVGLVFRYHUHGLQ
$IJKDQLVWDQVKRZHG2VDPDELQ/DGHQ·V WHUURUQHWZRUNKDGSODQQHG WRSURGXFHULFLQDQG WKH
IraqiVDUHVDLGWRKDYHPDQXIDFWXUHGLWLQWKHSDVWµ45 %URZQ·VFRPPHQWVDUHIXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGE\
a short clip of the prime minister speaking to the House of Commons, where he argues 
[i]t is only a matter of time before terrorists get hold of it [weapons of mass destruction], 
and as the arrests that were made earlier today show, the danger is present and real and 
with us now, and its potential is huge.46 
Indeed, these connections were repeatedly emphasised by the prime minister in statements and 
press conferences throughout the January and February 2003 period,47 where he made continual 
reference to the interlinked threat posed by Saddam Hussain, the terrorism of al-Qaeda, and 
WMD. In his most explicit, and persistent, example of such linking, Blair argues that 
WMD is not the only threat we face and Iraq is not the only country posing a risk in respect 
of WMD. Over the past few weeks, we have seen powerful evidence of the continuing 
terrorist threat: the suspected ricin plot in London and Manchester; al-Qaeda experiments 
in Afghanistan to develop chemical, biological and radiological weapons; the arrests of 
those linked to al-Qaeda in Spain and France; and further arrests in Italy.... I repeat my 
warning: unless we take a decisive stand now, as an international community, it is only a 
matter of time before these threats come together; that means pursuing international 
terrorism across the world in all its forms; it means confronting nations defying the world 
over WMD.48  
Though the recently published Chilcot report does not pass comment on the role of the news 
PHGLDGXULQJ WKLVSHULRG LWVDXWKRUVGRKLJKOLJKW WKH´IODZHGµQDWXUHRI WKH LQWHOOLJHQFHXSRQ
which claims such as this were made (2016: 6). As the report makes clear, in the months prior to 
war intelligence asseVVPHQWV ZHUH XVHG ´WR VXSSRUW *RYHUQPHQW VWDWHPHQWV LQ D ZD\ ZKLFK
FRQYH\HGFHUWDLQW\ZLWKRXWDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHµ9ROXPH6HFWLRQ
7: 612). As noted above, the Blair government had actually been advised that any possible links 
EHWZHHQWKHWZRZRXOG´EHKHLJKWHQHGE\PLOLWDU\DFWLRQDJDLQVW,UDTµZLWKWKHDGGLWLRQDO´ULVN
that the transfer of CB [chemical and biological] material or expertise, during or in the aftermath 
RIFRQIOLFWZLOOHQKDQFH$O4DLGD·VFDSDELOLWLHVµ-,& Assessment, February 19th 2003). While it is 
clear the BBC has a duty to report these statements for its audiences, in highlighting the links 
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between such disparate phenomena journalists like Brown can be accused, intentionally or not, of 
uncritically endorsing the validity of BlaLU·VFODLPV 
The repeated references, as mentioned above, to the September 11th 2001 attacks and the 
QDUURZKLVWRULFDOWLPHIUDPHRIWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµDOVRVWDQGWRVXSSRUWWKLVFODLPDVWKH\KHOS
to construct an almost one-dimensional vision of the terror threat that has very little political or 
historical roots outside of such a context. Indeed, this construction ignores the role of the British 
VHFXULW\VHUYLFHVLQSDUWLFXODU0,DQG/RQGRQ·V$QWL-Terror Branch of the Metropolitan Police, 
and its conciliatory relationship with prominent members of dissident Algerian groups based in 
London throughout the 1990s. As noted above, though this is not to say that the BBC knowingly 
conspired with the prime minister in its representation of the terror threat, in blurring the 
boundaries between the Wood Green plot, al-Qaeda, Iraq and WMD the Corporation 
inadvertently helped to make these connections appear natural or inevitable.  
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the way in which the BBC represented the terror threat within its ´1HZV
DW7HQµEXOOHWLQ during the alleged 2003 Wood Green ricin plot. In particular, it has shown how 
WKHVHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVXQZLWWLQJO\KHOSWRVXSSRUWDQGVXVWDLQDZLGHU´WHUURULVPµdispositif that has 
emerged in the years after the September 11th 2001 attacks. As a heterogeneous ensemble of 
associated discourses, institutions, identities and forms of knowledge and power, the dispositif is 
dependent upon the representations that support and underpin it. More crucially, these 
representations unwittingly work in the interests of elements within both al-Qaeda and the British 
executive, as they constitute a mutually-legitimising framework in which enables each to depend 
on the other for strength and sustenance. As emphasised, while the point here is not to accuse the 
BBC of being either passive or complicit in such a process, as one of the central mediums through 
which terrorists and governments seek to promote their own preferred representations, the 
EURDGFDVWHU·V´1HZVDW7HQµEXOOHWLQVKDve actively participated in the process of visually and 
26 
 
verbally constructing the terror threat for British citizens, helping to constitute the very identity of 
phenomena such as al-Qaeda, and, as a consequence, furthered the propaganda aims of such 
groups.  
1HYHUWKHOHVV ZKLOH WKLV DUWLFOH KDV VKRZQ KRZ WKH %%&·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV ZRUN LQ WKH
interests of al-4DHGDDQGWKH%ULWLVKH[HFXWLYHLWVKRXOGEHHPSKDVLVHGWKDWWKH´ WHUURULVPµdispostif 
is not controlled by any one group, and that its strategic orientation produces outcomes that are 
unplanned, unforeseen and, ultimately, unintended by those who benefit from such an ensemble. 
$V VXFK IRU WKH WZR JURXSV LGHQWLILHG KHUH WKH %%&·V UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RQO\ UHDOO\ VHUYH WKHLU
interests in the most basic and politically expedient sense. Thus, for al-Qaeda, despite significantly 
boosting its propaganda status, there is no discussion of the political aims and grievances that 
motivate its terrorism. Likewise, for the British executive these interest-driven representations also 
come at a significant social and political cost, as they can be said to have damaging consequences 
IRUWKH8.·VGHOLFDWHVRFLDO IDEULFWKURXJKRXWWKH´ZDURQWHUURUµSHULRG$VLIWRFRQILUPVXFKD
view, studies measuring individual fears of terror attacks around the time of the Wood Green 
events show that citizens were acutely aware of the dangers posed by phenomena such as al-Qaeda, 
and, moreover, reported relatively high expectations of an imminent attack (Goodwin et al 2005).   
Similarly, while much of the emphasis in this article has been on analysing discursive 
phenomena, such as the symbolic and representational manifestations of the dispositif, it is 
important to emphasise the fact that CDA is also powerfully suited for analysing the wider material 
forms and forces that constitute such a social ensemble (See Jäger & Maier 2009). Thus, in addition 
to the political interests explored here, news media representations are equally the product of 
market pressures which govern the way terrorism-related events are covered by the news media. 
For instance, in over-exaggerating the scale of terrorism-relate incidents, and in foregrounding the 
possible links between a range of disparate threats and societal dangers, news media institutions 
FDQEHDFFXVHGRISOD\LQJRQFLWL]HQV·ORRPLQJIHDUVRIWHUURULVPLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHODUJHUDXGLHQFH
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ratings and revenue, and thus stave of competition from other news providers.49 Scholars have 
pointed out that during the period under analysis, for example, the U.K. news landscape underwent 
increased threats of centralisation, concentration and competition, in particular from new online 
news providers, something that had a marked impact on coverage of terrorism (See Bromley & 
Cussion 2011). In fact, despite its status as a publicly-funded institution, the BBC itself was not 
immune from such market-driven pressures as it deliberately sought to redirect significant amounts 
of resources into its new online and user-generated services around this time in order to maintain 
LWV LQIOXHQFH LQ %ULWDLQ·V PHGLD ODQGVFDSH 6HH %HODLU-Gagnon 2015). The point here is that in 
focusing exclusively on the discursive manifestations of the dispositif, therefore, the analysis often 
neglects the wider role that material forces play in shaping representations of terror.   
Limitations aside, however, it is hoped that this article can make a clear contribution to 
inherently dualistic debates concerning the relationship between the news media and political 
actors, showing how Foucauldian concepts can provide sophisticated analytical tools within the 
field of media-related enquiry. Indeed, in light of the massive levels of media and political attention 
currently devoted to the armed conflict in Syria and, more specifically, the Islamic State 
phenomenon, it is hoped that future studies might find this concept useful when seeking to map 
out the various networks of relation that underpin and fuel this near-7 year conflict. Here, the 
concept of the dispositif can help to shed light on the power relations and the broad, mutually-
beneficial association that has emerged between movements such as the Islamic State, 24-hour 
global media organisations, such as Al Jazeera, BBC 24 and Fox News, the Assad, Putin and Trump 
UHJLPHVDQGWKHOHJLRQVRIGLJLWDODFWLYLVWVXVHIXO LGLRWVDQG´ZHE-ERWVµZKRGDLO\GLVVHPLQDWH
images, narratives and knowledge about the Syria conflict. While these individuals, groups, states 
and social movements each hold widely divergent ideological and political positions, each has a 
vested interest in representing this conflict to their core supporters. Thus, the (self)representation 
of Islamic State as an evil, conspiratorially-spreading threat to global stability not only works hand-
in-hand with cynical, ratings-driven news media portrayals, but also serves to sustain a fragile, yet 
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politically advantageous and mutually-legitimising, relationship between many of the key 
belligerents within this conflict, whereby each state actor promotes an idealised image of Islamic 
State that helps to reinforce their own regimes of truth and claims to self-identity.  
Within this shifting, ever-complex context, the imaginative scope of the dispositif concept 
is useful in that it enables us to locate and conceptualise disparate developments across the field 
of power-knowledge relations, thus helping us to connect circulations of representation between 
multiple actors, institutions and other sites of meaning. On a broader level, while not explored in 
detail here, this concept is particularly useful for exploring those moments of rupture and 
discontinuity that appear within news media representations of terrorism (See Ahmad 2018). This 
is because, as Deleuze points out, far from being fixed or static in nature, dispositifs DUH´FRQWLQXDOO\
DERUWLQJEXWZKHQUHVWDUWLQJLQDPRGLILHGZD\XQWLOWKHIRUPHUDSSDUDWXVLVEURNHQµ
Thus, in the words of Foucault, the aim of future research should be to focus on the way the 
dispositif SURGXFHVUHODWLRQVRIERWK´UHVRQDQFHDQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQµ 
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-anuary 7th %HQ%URZQ´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 2003); Margaret 
*LOPRUH´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th )UDQN*DUGQHU´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 2003); Margaret Gilmore, 
´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 0DUJDUHW*LOPRUH´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\ 9th *HRUJH$ODJLDK´1HZVDW
7HQµ-DQXDU\th 0DUJDUHW*LOPRUH´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th .HYLQ%RFTXHW´1HZVDW7HQµ
(January 14th 0DUJDUHW*LOPRUH´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 3HWHU6LVVRQV´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\ 
15th )UDQN*DUGQHU´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 2003), for examples. 
45 6HH%HQ%URZQ´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 2003). 
46 6HH7RQ\%ODLU´1HZVDW7HQµ-DQXDU\th 2003). 
47 6HH7RQ\%ODLU´306SHHFKWR)RUHLJQ2IILFH&RQIHUHQFHLQ/RQGRQµ-DQXDU\th 2003). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061101012618/http://number10.gov.uk/page1765 (Accessed 
December 27th 2017´7RQ\%ODLU´3ULPH0LQLVWHU3UHVV&RQIHUHQFHµ-DQXDU\th 2003). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/http://number10.gov.uk/page3005 (Accessed 
December 27th 20177RQ\%ODLU´$GGUHVVWRWKH+RXVHRI&RPPRQV/LDLVRQ&RPPLWWHHµ-DQXDU\st 2003). 
Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmliaisn/334-i/3012102.htm 
(Accessed December 27th 7RQ\%ODLU´3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH7RQ\%ODLUDQG-RVH0DULD$]QDUµ-DQXDU\st 
2003): Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/http://number10.gov.uk/page1768 (Accessed 
December 27th 20177RQ\%ODLU´3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH7RQ\%ODLUDQG*HRUJH:%XVKµ-DQXDU\st 2003). 
Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/http://number10.gov.uk/page1767 
(Accessed December 27th 20177RQ\%ODLU´6WDWHPHQWWR3DUOLDPHQWIROORZLQJ6XPPLWZLWK3UHVLGHQW%XVKµ
(February 5th 2003). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061101012618/http://number10.gov.uk/page1770 (Accessed 
December 27th 20177RQ\%ODLU´303UHVV&RQIHUHQFHµ)HEUXDU\th 2003). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061101012618/http://number10.gov.uk/page3007 (Accessed 
December 27th 2017). 
48 7RQ\%ODLU´6WDWHPHQWWR3DUOLDPHQWIROORZLQJ6XPPLWZLWK3UHVLGHQW%XVKµ)HEUXDU\th 2003). Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061101012618/http://number10.gov.uk/page1770 (Accessed 
December 27th 2017). 
49 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the wider economic relations that form part of 
the ´WHUURULVPµ dispositif.  
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